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ABSTRACT This paper presents a coalitional game for value sharing in energy communities (ECs). It is
proved that the game is super-additive, and the grand coalition effectively increases the global payoff. It is
also proved that the model is balanced and thus, it has a nonempty core. This means there always exists at
least one value sharing mechanism that makes the grand coalition stable. Therefore, prosumers will always
achieve lower bills if they join to form larger ECs. A counterexample is presented to demonstrate that the
game is not convex and value sharing based on Shapley values does not necessarily ensure the stability of the
coalition. To find a stabilizing value sharing mechanism that belongs to the core of the game, the worst-case
excess minimization concept is applied. In this concept, however, size of the optimization problem increases
exponentially with respect to the number of members in EC. To make the problem computationally tractable,
the idea of clustering members based on their generation/load profiles and considering the same profile
and share for members in the same cluster is proposed here. K-means algorithm is used for clustering
prosumers’ profiles. This way, the problem would have several redundant constraints that can be removed.
The redundant constraints are identified and removed via the generalized Llewellyn’s rules. Finally, value
sharing in an apartment building in the southern part of Finland in the metropolitan area is studied to
demonstrate effectiveness of the method.
INDEX TERMS Coalitional game theory, energy community, optimization problem, payoff allocation,
prosumer, redundant constraint, value sharing, worst-case excess minimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the desire to achieve sustainable development, the Paris
Agreement recommended all parties to put forward their best
efforts to alleviate urgent threat of climate change [1]. In line
with the agreement’s ambitious goals, integrating renewable
energy sources (RESs) in power systems serves as a pathway
towards lowering greenhouse gas emissions. The European
Union is targeting a 32% share for RESs in electricity con-
sumption by 2030 and 64-97% by 2050. Having these targets
in mind, penetration of solar energy is continuously growing
since it is practically feasible to install solar panels on the
rooftop of residential and commercial buildings. As a part
of decarbonization efforts, the concept of energy commu-
nities (ECs) has been raised by the European Commission
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Bin Zhou .
to empower end users, especially those who can generate,
store, and sell renewable energy. This has been among driving
forces for the formation of ECs in a couple of European
countries [2]. In line with that, to alleviate the increasing
complexity of power and energy management in systems
with high penetration of distributed energy sources, local
control schemes in ECs and microgrids beside global coor-
dination schemes have attracted much attention [3]. Among
different approaches for local control schemes, coalitional
control concept has been recently used to have local con-
trollers acting either cooperatively or independently at dif-
ferent times [4]–[6]. These all are among driving forces for
the formation of ECs and microgrids.
EC is an entity formed by voluntary participation of pro-
sumers with the goal to achieve economic, environmental,
and social community benefits [7]. A prosumer is an indi-
vidual/entity that can both produce and consume energy.
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ECs can encourage self-consumption of locally generated
energy thereby reducing network losses and operational
costs [8]. Formation of ECs has been studied in the litera-
ture. In [9], an optimization model has been developed to
minimize the cost of electricity consumed by a community
of smart households. The study has demonstrated that form-
ing an EC leads to lower aggregated costs compared to the
case where the households would individually minimize their
costs. In [10], coalitional game theory has been applied to
model forming ECs considering the presence of flexible loads
and uncertainties associated with renewable energy sources.
The article has proved that forming ECs is almost always
advantageous for the members. In [11], it has been shown
that even simple energy consumers can gain cost savings from
joining ECs. In [12]–[14], it has been shown that sharing costs
and revenues of a common storage in an EC reduces the cost
volatility for most prosumers, while the expected operational
cost of the community remains unchanged. In [15], interac-
tions among interconnected and autonomous microgrids have
been modeled. In the study, it has been shown that formation
of a community of microgrids leads to lower costs. In the
works reported in [10] and [16], it has been proved that EC
as a cooperative game is balanced, and energy cost savings
from the cooperation can be shared such that no individual
has incentive to leave the community.
There exist some approaches for sharing the value achieved
by forming an EC among the members. The most promi-
nent approaches are based on Shapley values, nucleolus con-
cept, and the worst-case excess minimization concept [10]
and [17], [18]. The Shapley values reflect coalition members’
marginal impact on the value created by forming the coalition.
Although value sharing based on Shapley values can be fair,
it leads to a stable coalition only if the game is convex.
In [9], [11], and [19], value sharing in EC has been done
based on Shapley values. The study presented in [16] has
demonstrated that value sharing based on Shapley values
is not stabilizing in EC since the EC game is not convex.
To tackle the issue, [16] has applied the nucleolus concept to
allocate the extra benefit to the coalitionmembers. It has com-
pared the results with those achieved by the Shapley values
and demonstrated that value sharing based on the nucleolus
concept is stabilizing. In the study provided in [7], it has been
observed that though value sharing based on the nucleolus
concept provides a stabilizing mechanism, its calculation is
highly intensive. Reference [10] has used optimization-based
value sharing mechanisms to stabilize ECs. That study has
compared nucleolus concept and the worst-case excess min-
imization problem. According to the study, the two methods
lead to the same payoffs, but nucleolus is computationally
intractable in larger communities. In [20]–[22], coalitions
formed by wind power producers to reduce variability in their
aggregated power thus improving their expected profit have
been studied. In the studies, the worst-case excess minimiza-
tion problem has been solved to allocate the extra profit to
the coalition members. In the worst-case excess minimiza-
tion problem, the number of constraints grows exponentially
with the number of members in the coalition. This limits
application of the worst-case excess minimization concept
to smaller ECs. To overcome this limitation, [23], [24] have
presented a stabilizing value sharing mechanism based on an
analytical formula. The presented method is very effective
since it provides a stabilizing mechanism without significant
computational complexities. However, value sharing mech-
anism based on the analytical formula allocates the whole
cooperation benefit to consumers if the community net con-
sumption is negative. This may result in dissatisfaction of
producers who have invested on local generation facilities.
This is in clear contradiction with the global trend toward
incentivizing investment on local generation facilities.
Since the EC game is not convex, it is likely that it has
several stabilizing value sharing mechanisms. On the other
hand, a value sharing mechanism is stabilizing if and only
if it satisfies the constraints in the worst-case excess min-
imization problem. So, to find a fairer and still stabilizing
mechanism, onemay need to solve theworst-case excessmin-
imization problem. The importance of searching for a value
sharing mechanism that is both fair and stabilizing has been
explained in [25]. However, the huge number of constraints
in the worst-case excess minimization problem is a barrier.
To fill the gap, this article proposes the idea of assuming
the same payoff for prosumers with rather similar genera-
tion/consumption profiles. To do so, prosumers’ profiles are
clustered and similar profile and payoff are considered for
prosumers in the same cluster. K-means clustering approach
is applied and clusters’ centroids are used to represent pro-
sumers in each cluster. Doing so, several constraints in the
worst-case excess minimization problem become redundant.
Then, Llewellyn’s rules are used to identify and remove
redundant constraints to achieve a computationally tractable
problem. The proposed method is applied to an apartment
building in the southern part of Finland in the metropolitan
area. Based on the results, computational burden of the prob-
lem can be decreased significantly without jeopardizing out-
come accuracy if appropriate number of clusters is selected.
Accordingly, the main contributions of the current paper can
be summarized as follows:
• The formation of an EC is studied via coalitional game
theory concept and different properties of the EC game
are discussed.
• A computationally efficient procedure is developed to
solve the worst-case excess minimization problem. This
provides the opportunity to find a fairer and still stabi-
lizing value sharing mechanism for ECs.
• The developed procedure significantly decreases size
of the worst-case excess minimization problem without
much affecting the results. This is demonstrated via
applying the procedure to a real apartment building in
the southern part of Finland.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
a brief description of coalitional game theory is presented.
Section III describes the EC problem and presents a coali-
tional game for the problem. It also investigates properties of
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the game and presents a stabilizing value sharing mechanism
for the game. In Section IV, evidences from numerical analy-
ses are provided. Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
II. COALITIONAL GAME THEORY
This section provides a brief background for the coalitional
game theory, key definitions, and relevant theorems. Coali-
tional game theory deals with problems where the compe-
tition is between groups of players. In coalitional games,
the focus is mainly on predicting coalitions that may form
and the payoffs. Coalitional game theory has been extensively
used in different disciplines and several definitions and theo-
rems related to coalitional games have been introduced [12]
and [20]. Hereinafter, some of the definitions and theorems
necessary to study the proposed game are reviewed. The inter-
ested reader may see [17], [18] for more detailed explanations
on the topic.
Definition 1 (Coalition): Assuming N := {1, 2, . . . ,N } as
the set of players, a coalition is any subset S ⊆ N. The set of
all possible coalitions is defined as the power set 2N of N .
Definition 2 (Grand Coalition): Grand coalition is a coali-
tion with all players. AssumingN := {1, 2, . . . ,N } as the set
of players, N itself is grand coalition.
Definition 3 (Coalition Value): Total value created by
forming a coalition is called coalition value. Coalition value
is also known as coalition payoff. Payoff and value are used
interchangeably in this article.
Definition 4 (Value Sharing): A mechanism that describes
how to share coalition value between the members is called
value sharing or payoff allocation.
Definition 5 (Transferable Payoff): A coalitional game
without any restriction on sharing coalition value between the
members is a game with a transferable payoff.
Coalitional games with transferable payoff can be repre-
sented by a pair (2N ,v) where 2N is the set of possible
coalitions of the game and v : 2N → R is the value function
that assigns a value to each coalition S ⊆ N.
Definition 6 (Core): Core is the set of value sharing mech-
anisms for which no group of players has an incentive to
leave the grand coalition. A game with empty core does not
necessarily have a stable grand coalition since members may
leave the coalition with the desire for a higher payoff.
Definition 7 (Super-Additive Game): A game is super-
additive if in the game, value of a coalition cannot be
improved by splitting it into two smaller coalitions.
Assuming two disjoint coalitions S and T, super-additivity
of a coalitional game can be mathematically evaluated by
checking the following condition:
v (S)+ v (T) ≤ v (S ∪ T) ∀S, T ⊆ N, S ∩ T = ∅ (1)
Theorem 1: In a super-additive game, grand coalition has
the highest created value [18].
Definition 8 (Convex Game): A game is convex if a
marginal contribution of any player does not decrease if the
player participates in a larger coalition.
Assuming grand coalition N, coalition T ⊆ N, and coali-
tion S ⊆ T, the convexity of a coalitional game can be
evaluated by checking the following condition:
v (S ∪ {i})− v (S) ≤ v (T ∪ {i})− v (T) ∀i /∈ T (2)
Theorem 2: A convex game has a nonempty core and
Shapley values provide a stable value sharing mechanism
inside the core [18].
Definition 9 (Balanced Game): A game is balanced if the
weighted sum of values of coalitions containing player i is
less than or equal to the value of grand coalition provided
that the weights are inside [0, 1] and their sum is equal to 1.
Assuming grand coalition N and any arbitrary player
i ∈ N, balancedness of a coalitional game can be mathemati-
cally evaluated by checking the following condition:∑
S⊆N
i∈S
α (S)v (S) ≤ v (N) ∀α ∈ [0, 1] ,
∑
α (S) = 1
(3)
Theorem 3: A balanced coalitional game has a nonempty
core [18].
III. COALITIONAL GAME FOR ENERGY COMMUNITY
This section presents a value sharing mechanism for ECs
based on coalitional game theory. The function of the value
created by an EC and its properties are first discussed. Then,
description of a coalitional game for the EC is followed by
proposing a stable value sharing mechanism for the game.
A. VALUE FUNCTION IN ENERGY COMMUNITY
An EC consists of prosumers. Here, it is assumed that a
consumer is also a prosumer with zero production. Simi-
larly, the owner of a local generating unit is a prosumer
whose energy consumption is negative. Although formation
of EC can have different incentives, economic incentive of
EC formation is considered in this article. With these in mind,
the value created by an EC ismathematically formulated here.
Consider a group ofN prosumers, i.e.,N := {1, 2, . . . ,N },
indexed by i ∈ N. The power produced/consumed by pro-
sumer i at time t is denoted by pi (t) ∈ R. It is assumed
that all prosumers are hosted by a common bus in the electric
power network. So, they are charged with common electricity
prices. It is assumed that energy can be imported from the
network at a non-negative price λ ∈ R+ (c//kWh) and can
be exported to the network at a non-negative price µ ∈ R+
(c//kWh). It is assumed that the price for importing electricity
from the network is greater than or equal to the price for
exporting electricity to the network, i.e., λ ≥ µ. Note that the
assumption makes sense especially in networks with higher
integration of renewable energy sources [10]. The same
assumption has beenmade in many research works [10], [16],
and [19]. On the ground of this assumption, therewill be some
individual prosumers who are willing to form EC S ⊆ N
and aggregate their production/consumption to reduce their
net power exchange with the network. In other words, it is
always economically profitable to exchange prosumers’ extra
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produced power inside the community. The aggregate output
corresponding to the EC formed by prosumers inside S ⊆ N




pi (t) ∀t ∈ T (4)
Note that pS (t) takes negative values if production by the
prosumers exceeds their consumption at time t . The value

























where x+ := max {x, 0} and x− := min {x, 0} for all
x ∈ R. In (5), the first term is the electricity cost of all
individual prosumers in coalition S over time interval T if
the prosumers do not participate in the EC, and the second
term is electricity cost of EC S over time interval T . In the
first term λpi (t)+/µpi (t)− is the value prosumer i should pay
for importing/exporting power from/to the network at time t .
Note that λpi (t)+ and µpi (t)− are respectively positive and
zero if prosumer i imports power from the network at time t .
They are respectively zero and negative if prosumer i exports




]+ and µ[∑i∈S pi (t)]− and EC S aggregated
power. It is worth mentioning that formation of EC may have
some cost in practice. The cost can be divided into investment
costs and operation costs. Investment costs can be caused by
necessary changes in metering systems and facilities as well
as contract design. Operation costs can be due to additional
processes required for value sharing and billing inside the
community. These costs are however overlooked in this study.
This assumption is in line with the literature where no cost has
been considered for EC formation [9]–[14].
The following Lemmas establish certain properties of 5.
Lemma 1: The function 5 as defined in (5) is positively
homogeneous. This implies that
5(αpi∈S (t)) = α5 (pi∈S (t)) ∀α ∈ R+ (6)














































which is equivalent to (6).
Lemma 2: The function 5 as defined in (5) is super-
additive. Assuming two disjoint ECs S ⊆ N and T ⊆ N,
Lemma 2 implies that
5(pi∈S∪T (t)) ≥ 5(pi∈S (t))+5(pi∈T (t)) (9)



















































































































which is clearly equivalent to (9).
In this section, value function of an EC and its properties
are discussed. This function and the associated properties are
used in the next section to characterize the EC game.
B. ENERGY COMMUNITY GAME
The concept of coalitional games is used here to study pro-
sumers willingness to form a coalition (i.e., EC). Consider a
group of N prosumers indexed by i ∈ N := {1, 2, . . . ,N }.
Define v (S) as value function of any coalition S ⊆ N:





The added value achieved by forming an EC is a reduc-
tion in aggregated electricity bill. The added value can be
shared among the prosumers without any restriction. This
means that the EC game is a game with transferable payoff.
As mentioned earlier, a game with transferable payoff can
be represented by its set of possible coalitions and value
function, i.e., (2N ,v). Therefore, the EC game is represented
by the pair (2N ,v).
Theorem 4: EC game is super-additive.
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Proof: From super-additivity property of function 5
established in Lemma 2, for any disjoint pair of coalitions










(5 (pi∈S (t))+5(pi∈T (t))) (14)
since S and T are disjoint coalitions, maximizing sum of the































From value function definition provided in (13), we have:
v (S ∪ T) ≥ v (S)+ v (T) (17)
Thus, the game is super-additive.
It is worthwhile to note that super-additivity of the EC
game guarantees that prosumers can always decrease their
aggregated bill by forming coalitions with other prosumers.
The larger the coalition (i.e., EC) the greater reduction in
aggregated electricity bill. This can be translated to the fact
that grand coalition is the best coalition for any set of pro-
sumers. This however does not guarantee that there exist
value sharing mechanisms to make the grand coalition stable.
It is also worth pointing out that the game is super-additive if
EC formation costs are overlooked. On the other hand, if the
costs are significant and cannot be overlooked, it is likely
that grand coalition does not become the best option. This is
because if the cost imposed by joining a prosumer to an EC
exceeds the potential added value it brings, the game is not
super-additive anymore and it cannot be claimed that grand
coalition is the best coalition.
Theorem 5: EC game is balanced.
Proof:Assume α : 2N → [0, 1] be a balanced collection
of weights [18]. Since the game is super-additive and grand
coalition has the highest value, we have∑
S∈ 2N
α (S)v (S) ≤
∑
S∈ 2N
α (S)v (N) (18)
Since v (N) is constant and
∑
S∈ 2N α (S) = 1 holds for
any balanced map, we have∑
S∈ 2N
α (S)v (S) ≤ v (N) (19)
Thus, the game is balanced.
The direct result of balancedness of the game is that the
core is nonempty. This guarantees that there exists at least one
value sharing mechanism to make the grand coalition stable.
This means if the total payoff is divided among the members
TABLE 1. A sample EC with three Prosumers: Individual hourly
consumption (kWh).
using the value sharing mechanism, no member has incentive
to leave the grand coalition.
Theorem 6: EC game is not convex.
Proof: Here, a counterexample is presented to show that
the EC game is not convex. To do so, consider an EC involv-
ing three prosumers, N := {1, 2, 3}. The electric energy
demand of the prosumers during a 4-hour study horizon is
provided in the following table:
In Table 1, negative consumption is equivalent to energy
production. In this example, it is assumed that the electric-
ity price for procuring from the network is 16 c//kWh. The
price for injecting power to the network is 5 c//kWh. Using
(5), the value associated with each coalition is calculated as
follows:
v ({1}) = v ({2}) = v ({3}) = 0
v ({2, 3}) = 0
v ({1, 2}) = v ({1, 3}) = v ({1, 2, 3}) = 11c/
Based on the above values, we have
v ({1, 3})− v ({1}) ≥ v ({1, 2, 3})− v ({1, 2}) ,
which contradicts the necessary condition for convexity,
i.e., (2). Thus, the EC game is not convex. As mentioned
earlier, if a coalitional game is not convex, Shapley values do
not necessarily provide a stable value sharing mechanism for
the grand coalition. Sharing value based on Shapley values,
the three prosumers receive a payoff equal to 7.26, 1.87,
and 1.87 c/, respectively. As can be seen, the total share of
Prosumers 1 and 2 is 9.13 c/ in aggregate while the two
prosumers have an incentive to leave the grand coalition,
form coalition {1,2}, and increase their total share to 11 c/.
Thus, value sharing mechanism based on Shapley values is
not in the core for the EC game. This urges the importance of
proposing a stabilizing value sharing mechanism for the EC
game.
C. STABILIZING VALUE SHARING MECHANISM
There are different approaches to find a stabilizing value
sharingmechanism for a balanced game. Among them, nucle-
olus concept and worst-case excess minimization are more
popular [10]. In addition, the analytical formula proposed
in [24] can be applied. Since nucleolus-based value sharing is
computationally intractable in ECs [10], it is not considered
here. The analytical formula is very effective since it provides
a stabilizing mechanism without significant computational
complexities. However, value sharing mechanism based on
the analytical formula allocates the whole cooperation benefit
to consumers if the community net consumption is negative.
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This may result in dissatisfaction of producers who have
invested on local generation facilities. This is in clear con-
tradiction with the global trend toward incentivizing invest-
ment on local generation facilities. Since the EC game is
not convex, it is likely that it has several stabilizing value
sharing mechanisms. So, in the hope of finding a fairer and
still stabilizingmechanism,minimizing theworst-case excess







xi ≤ ε ∀S ∈ 2N∑
i∈N
xi = v (N) (20)
In the above problem, x denotes the share of prosumers
from the value created by forming an EC including all pro-
sumers. Note that ε must take zero or a negative value at the
final solution. Otherwise, there are some prosumers willing
to leave the EC to increase their payoff.
In (20), the objective function is optimized subject to a
system of linear inequality constraints. The problem is linear
and can be solved via several off-the-shelf optimization tools.
However, size of the problem grows exponentially as the
number of prosumers increases. The computation burden and
time grow very fast as the size increases. The huge number
of constraints may also make storage requirements challeng-
ing. These may lead to difficulties in handling the problem,
especially in larger ECs with tens of prosumers.
FIGURE 1. Flowchart of the proposed value sharing approach.
To alleviate computational burden and time needed to solve
the problem, this article proposes to use similarity between
prosumers’ profiles. Step-by-step of the proposed method
is depicted in the flowchart in Fig. 1. According to the
flowchart, the first step is to cluster prosumers’ profiles into
a predefined number of clusters. To do so, this article uses
k-means approach as a vector quantization approach. This
method minimizes within-cluster variances, thereby putting
more similar profiles in the same cluster. Since k-means
clustering problem is computationally difficult, heuristic
approaches can be applied to solve the clustering problem.
The heuristic approaches are usually efficient and quick but
may converge to a local optimum. To avoid a local opti-
mum clustering, it is recommended to iterate the process
a few times and select the solution with the least achieved
within-cluster variances.
The selection of the number of clusters is important. Too
many clusters may lead to a computationally intractable prob-
lem. On the other hand, a small number of clusters can lead
to inaccurate results. In ECs with more similar prosumers
like residential ECs, smaller number of clusters is possible
without significantly endangering results accuracy. In ECs
with prosumers with quite different profiles like industrial
and commercial ECs, however, a larger number of clusters
is necessary to preserve accuracy. Selecting an appropriate
number of clusters is more elaborated later in this section.
Once the prosumers in each cluster and cluster centroids
are determined, prosumers’ profiles are modified. To do so,
the profile of prosumers in a cluster is replaced with the
centroid of the cluster. In addition, only one variable is used to
indicate the share of prosumers in a cluster. This way, number
of variables in the problem is decreased, thereby reducing
dimension of the problem.
In the next step, the inequality constraints are investi-
gated to remove redundant constraints. It is worth mention-
ing that constraints in a problem can be divided into two
categories namely necessary constraints and redundant con-
straints. A necessary constraint cannot be removed from the
problem since its removal may change the solution. A redun-
dant constraint can however be removedwithout changing the
solution of the original problem. In other words, considering
redundant constraints does not change the feasible region
defined by the necessary constraints. To identify redundant
constraints, a generalization of Llewellyn’s rules [26] is con-
sidered here. Consider the following two constraints:
α1,1x1 + α1,2x2 + · · · + α1,nxn ≥ β1
α2,1x1 + α2,2x2 + · · · + α2,nxn ≥ β2
The generalization of Llewellyn’s rules states that the first
constraint is redundant and can be removed if following
conditions hold
βi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ {1, 2}







Fortunately, the two first conditions always hold in the
worst-case excessminimization problem for ECs. In addition,
since the EC game is super-additive, v (S) ≤ v (T) holds
if S ⊆ T. So, the constraint associated with coalition T is
redundant and can be removed if S ⊆ T and v (S) = v (T).
It is worth mentioning that comparing values created by
EC, i.e., v (N), before and after applying the method gives a
hint about the potential error in the prosumers’ shares. The
larger difference between the values is, the more erroneous
shares for prosumers are achieved. So, it is recommended
to calculate the difference for different numbers of clusters
first and then select the appropriate number according to the
calculated values. This is more elaborated in the next section.
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FIGURE 2. Prosumers’ electricity consumption and selling price profiles.
IV. SIMULATIONS AND RESULTS
This section studies the EC game and characteristics of the
worst-case excess minimization problem for value sharing.
It also evaluates performance of the proposed approach in
alleviating computational burden and time of the problem.
To do so, description of the case under study is followed
by comprehensive discussions on numerical results. In the
studies, optimization problems are solved via GNU linear
programming kit (GLPK) solver in Pyomo Python module
using an Intel Core i5 CPU 1.9 GHz, with 16.0 GB of RAM.
A. CASE STUDY
To study properties of the EC game, an apartment building
in the southern part of Finland in the metropolitan area is
considered. The building has 24 apartments. Approximately,
half of the roof area is assigned to solar panels with 15 kW
capacity owned by 12 apartments. The hourly data associated
with consumers’ electricity consumption, solar radiation, and
wholesale market price are for March 7, 2018. According to
the measurements, the community consumes about 128 kWh
during the day. The solar panels generate about 38 kWh in
aggregate. The peak demand is 7.22 kW that occurs at 8 in
the evening. Solar power is available from 8 in the morning to
5 in the afternoon. The maximum power generation happens
at 1 p.m. when 10 apartments have surplus generation. During
the day, the community has surplus generation from 1 p.m.
to 3 p.m. The community is supplied by Helen Group which
consists of both retailer and electric distribution company in
the area. According to the historical data, average electric-
ity price was 16.12 c/ per kWh in the first season in 2018.
This price is considered as the price for importing electricity
from the network. Helen buys surplus generation based on
wholesale market prices which were about 4.7 c/ per kWh on
average. The large gap between the purchasing and selling
prices provides a significant incentive for sharing surplus
generation inside the EC. It is worth mentioning that energy
sharing within an EC located within one property is exempt
from tax, VAT, and network tariff in Finland. Fig. 2 depicts
prosumers’ electricity consumption profiles and hourly prices
for selling electricity to the network.
B. NUMERICAL RESULTS
The prosumers’ electricity consumption costs are given
in Table 2. Needless to mention, negative values represent
TABLE 2. Prosumers’ electricity consumption cost [c/].
TABLE 3. Best coalitions with different numbers of members.
net revenue of the prosumer from selling electricity to the
network. As can be seen in the table, Prosumers 15 and
23 have the highest surplus energy, which is sold to the
network, thereby causing negative costs. On the other hand,
Prosumers 1, 2, 10, and 19 consume more energy.
The prosumers may form coalitions to achieve savings in
their costs. Since there exist 24 prosumers, coalitions with
2 to 24 members can be imagined. Table 3 presents the best
coalitions with different numbers of members. As can be
seen, the payoff increases as the number of members grows.
This is because the EC game is super-additive. As another
observation, the best match is between the prosumer with
the highest generation, i.e., Prosumer 15, and one of the
prosumers with a high consumption, i.e., Prosumer 2. It is
worth noting that though Prosumers 1, 10, and 19 have higher
total energy consumptions, but Prosumer 2 consumes more
energy during the time Prosumer 15 has surplus generation.
According to the results, the grand coalition is the answer to
the EC game since it provides the highest payoff. It is worth
mentioning that this observation is because purchasing price
of electricity is higher than its selling price. If selling price
is higher, it is not beneficial for prosumers to form EC and
share surplus generation inside the EC since they are able to
sell the surplus to the network with higher prices.
Assuming grand coalition as EC, value sharing based on
Shapley values is calculated. Although it is proved that value
sharing based on Shapley values is not necessarily stabilizing
for EC game, it is still valuable to calculate and report the
values since value sharing based on Shapley values have been
extensively applied in the literature [9], [11], [19]. In addition,
the proof was based on a small EC as counterexample. So,
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FIGURE 3. Shapley values vs. sample numbers in Monte Carlo simulation.
TABLE 4. Prosumers’ value shares [c/]: Shapley values.
TABLE 5. Prosumers’ value shares [c/]: Minimizing the worst-case excess.
it makes sense to demonstrate that in a practical EC too.
To calculate Shapley values, the Monte Carlo Simulation
approach with 100,000 samples is used [27]. Fig. 3 depicts
that the values get almost stable after 10,000 samples.
The results of value sharing based on Shapley values are
given in Table 4. As an interesting observation, prosumers
with higher generation capability like Prosumers 15 and
23 receive higher shares. According to the results, sum of the
shares associated with all prosumers but 8 and 12 is 222.56 c/
while the prosumers have opportunity to form a 22-member
EC to increase their total value to 223.78 c/ (See Table 3 ).
This means that value sharing based on Shapley values is not
stabilizing for the EC game.
As proved earlier, the EC game has stabilizing value shares
which can be found via solving (20). The optimization prob-
lem is solved for the community, and the achieved shares are
given in Table 5. The shares are stabilizing, and no group of
prosumers has an incentive to leave the grand coalition.
Although the worst-case excess minimization provides
stabilizing shares, this method may become computation-
ally intractable in larger ECs. Fig. 4 depicts the number of
constraints and computation time of the problem versus the
FIGURE 4. Number of constraints and runtime vs. number of prosumers.
TABLE 6. Number of redundant constraints (red. cons.) and runtime for
different number of clusters.
number of prosumers in the EC. As can be seen, size of the
problem and the associated run time exponentially grow as
the number of prosumers increases. As can be seen, it takes
more than 300 thousand seconds (i.e., about 3.5 days) to solve
the problem for the EC with 24 prosumers. The problem for
the EC with 24 prosumers has about 16.8 Million constraints.
To evaluate performance of the proposed approach, it is
applied to the EC and the prosumers are clustered in dif-
ferent numbers of clusters. It is crystal clear that using a
lower number of clusters leads to more redundant constraints.
Table 6 provides the number of redundant constraints and
runtime for different numbers of clusters. In the table, {x,y}
indicates x clusters with y prosumers. Needless to mention,
the first row that has 24 clusters all with 1 prosumer is the
base case where prosumers are not clustered. According to
the results, the number of redundant constraints increases,
and the runtime of the problem decreases as the number of
clusters is reduced. As can be seen from the results, using
19 clusters, the run time decreases by more than 97% and the
number of constraints is reduced by 5 times.
Although the results demonstrate great performance of
prosumer clustering and redundant constraint removal in
reducing problem size and runtime, it is likely that clustering
prosumers in a small number of clusters leads to inaccurate
shares for the prosumers. Table 7 presents accuracy indices
of the results for different numbers of clusters. The indices
are error in total community payoff (ETCP), average error in
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TABLE 7. Accuracy indices of the proposed value sharing mechanism for
different number of clusters.
FIGURE 5. Electricity consumption profile of prosumers in different
clusters.
individual shares (AEIS), and maximum error in individual
shares (MEIS). According to the results, the error in total
community payoff is less than 1 c/ for cases with the number
of clusters greater than or equal to 17. The error is less than
1% in all cases with greater than or equal to 13 clusters.
AEIS is less than 1 (2) c/ if the number of clusters is greater
than or equal to 16 (13). Finally, MEIS is less than 1 (2)
c/ if the number of clusters is greater than or equal to 20
(17). Therefore, it can be concluded that selecting 20 clusters
can lead to almost accurate results and selecting 17 clusters
leads to negligible error in EC payoff and prosumers’ shares.
This negligible error can be overlooked considering the great
performance of the proposed approach in reducing problem
size and runtime (See Table 6 ). ETCP, AEIS, and MEIS
error indices are positively correlated. This means that ETCP
can be considered as an indicator to determine the number
of clusters before solving the problem. It is worthwhile to
mention that ETCP can be calculated before solving the
problem while AEIS and MEIS can be calculated only once
the problem is solved.
Assuming 17 clusters, Fig. 5 depicts prosumers’ electricity
consumption profiles in different clusters. The black profiles
belong to prosumers in clusters with one member. As can be
seen in the figure, there are 3 clusters with more than one
prosumer. AEIS index is equal to 1.40, 1.33, and 0.83 c/ for
the red, blue, and green clusters in the figure. MEIS index
is equal to 1.97, 1.51, and 0.83 c/ for the red, blue, and green
clusters in the figure. Considering the number of prosumers in
the 3 clusters, it can be concluded that both error indices grow
as the number of prosumers in a cluster increase. On the other
hand, AEIS and MEIS indices are respectively 0.0003 and
0.0008 c/ for the remaining prosumers. This means that the
shares are accurate for prosumers in clusters with only one
member.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a coalitional game was presented for ECs. The
game has been proved to be super-additive and balanced but
not convex. It has been demonstrated that Shapley values
do not provide a stabilizing value sharing mechanism for
grand coalition. To find a stabilizing mechanism, minimiza-
tion of the worst-case excess has been applied. It has been
shown that size and runtime of the optimization problem
grow dramatically as the number of prosumers in the EC
increases. To handle computational complexity of the prob-
lem, clustering prosumers based on their electricity consump-
tion profiles and removing redundant constraints have been
proposed. To do so, k-means clustering algorithm has been
used to cluster prosumers to a predefined number of clusters.
Then, generalization of Llewellyn’s rules have been applied
to remove redundant constraints. Owing to the simulation
results, the number of redundant constraints is considerable
even if the prosumers are clustered into several clusters.
It has been shown that the problem size and runtime can be
decreased significantly in the cost of negligible error in share
values. The error in the shares is more significant in clusters
with more prosumers while the shares are almost accurate for
prosumers in clusters with only one prosumer.
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